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Information and Disclosure in Strategic Trade Policy

  • Anthony Creane
  • Kaz Miyagiwa

We examine the standard assumption in the strategic trade policy literature that governments possess complete information. Assuming instead that firms have better information, we explore the long-term incentives for firms to consistently disclose information to their governments in the standard setting. We find that with quantity competition firms disclose both demand and cost information to the governments, thereby giving some justification to the literature's omniscient-government assumption. Further, the equilibrium exhibits an informational prisoner's dilemma with demand uncertainty, but not with cost uncertainty. With price competition, however, firms have no incentives to disclose information.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta) in its series Emory Economics with number 0530.

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Date of creation: Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:emo:wp2003:0530
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  1. Brander, James A., 1995. "Strategic trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1395-1455 Elsevier.
  2. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December.
  3. Maggi, Giovanni, 1999. "Strategic Trade Policy under Incomplete Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(3), pages 571-94, August.
  4. Brainard, S Lael & Martimort, David, 1996. "Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 81-105, January.
  5. Eaton, Jonathan & Grossman, Gene M, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406, May.
  6. Okajima, Yoshitomo, 2003. "A note on 'optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information'," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 243-246, October.
  7. Maggi, Giovanni, 1998. "A Note on "Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts."," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 623-25, July.
  8. Xavier Vives, 1990. "Trade Association Disclosure Rules, Incentives to Share Information, and Welfare," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(3), pages 409-430, Autumn.
  9. Creane, Anthony & Miyagiwa, Kaz, 2008. "Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 229-244, May.
  10. Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono, . "Asymmetric Oligopoly, International Trade, and Welfare: Synthesis," Economics Discussion Papers 435, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
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