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Unraveling Public Good Games: The Role of Priors

  • Espinosa Alejos, María Paz
  • Brañas Garza, Pablo

This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects\' beliefs on contributions and allow us to conclude that, firstly, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, secondly, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end game effects and there is very little updating of beliefs.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10810/6474
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Paper provided by University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II in its series DFAEII Working Papers with number 2010-04.

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Date of creation: Feb 2010
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Handle: RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:201004
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Order Information: Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, = Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
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