Should Owners of Firms Delegate Long-run Decisions?
This paper analyzes whether owners of firms have incentives to delegate their long-run decisions to managers or not. The result arising from our analysis shows that owners do have incentives to keep their long-run decisions (the location of the firm) to themselves. In this context we show that the delegation of short-run decisions (prices) to the managers leads to an increase in the degree of product differentiation with regard to the case in which firms do not hire managers.
|Date of creation:||Nov 1999|
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|Order Information:|| Postal: Dpto. de Econometría y Estadística, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain|
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