IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Risk Management in Action. Robust monetary policy rules under structured uncertainty

  • Levine, Paul
  • McAdam, Peter
  • Pearlman, Joseph G.
  • Pierse, Richard

Recent interest in ‘Risk Management’ has highlighted the relevance of Bayesian analysis for robust monetary- policy making. This paper sets out a comprehensive methodology for designing policy rules inspired by such considerations. We design rules that are robust with respect to model uncertainty facing both the policy-maker and private sector. We apply our methodology to three simple interest-rate rules: inflation-forecast- based (IFB) rules with a discrete forward horizon, one targeting a discounted sum of forward inflation, and a current wage inflation rule. We use an estimated DSGE model of the euro area and estimated measures of structured exogenous and parameter uncertainty for the exercise. We find that IFB rules with a long horizon perform poorly with or without robust design. Our discounted future targeting rule performs much better, indicating that policy can be highly forward-looking without compromising stabilization. The wage inflation rule dominates whether it is designed to have good robust properties or not. JEL Classification: E52, E37, E58

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp870.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by European Central Bank in its series Working Paper Series with number 0870.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20080870
Contact details of provider: Postal: 60640 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Phone: +49 69 1344 0
Fax: +49 69 1344 6000
Web page: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521441964 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Coenen, Günter & McAdam, Peter & Straub, Roland, 2008. "Tax reform and labour-market performance in the euro area: A simulation-based analysis using the New Area-Wide Model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 2543-2583, August.
  3. DavidG. Blanchflower & Chris Shadforth, 2009. "Fear, Unemployment and Migration," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(535), pages F136-F182, 02.
  4. Levine, Paul & McAdam, Peter & Pearlman, Joseph G., 2006. "Inflation forecast-based-rules and indeterminacy: a puzzle and a resolution," Working Paper Series 0643, European Central Bank.
  5. Walsh, Carl E., 2004. "Implications of a Changing Economic Structure for the Strategy of Monetary Policy," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt84g1q1g6, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
  6. David N. DeJong & Beth F. Ingram & Charles H. Whiteman, 2000. "Keynesian impulses versus Solow residuals: identifying sources of business cycle fluctuations," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(3), pages 311-329.
  7. Nicoletta Batini & Joe Pearlman, 2002. "Too Much Too Soon: Instability and Indeterminacy with Forward-Looking Rules," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 182, Society for Computational Economics.
  8. Volker Wieland & Gunter Coenen, 2003. "The Zero-Interest-Rate Bound and the Role of the Exchange Rate for Monetary Policy in Japan," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 138, Society for Computational Economics.
  9. Alan Greenspan, 2004. "Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 33-40, May.
  10. Chris Otrok, 1999. "On Measuring the Welfare Cost of Business Cycles," Virginia Economics Online Papers 318, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  11. Klaus Adam & Roberto M. Billi, 2005. "Discretionary monetary policy and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates," Research Working Paper RWP 05-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  12. Hansen, Lars Peter & Sargent, Thomas J., 2003. "Robust control of forward-looking models," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 581-604, April.
  13. Brock, William A. & Durlauf, Steven N. & West, Kenneth D., 2007. "Model uncertainty and policy evaluation: Some theory and empirics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 136(2), pages 629-664, February.
  14. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé & Martín Uribe, 2006. "Optimal Simple and Implementable Monetary and Fiscal Rules: Expanded Version," NBER Working Papers 12402, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Angeloni, Ignazio & Coenen, Günter & Smets, Frank, 2003. "Persistence, the transmission mechanism and robust monetary policy," Working Paper Series 0250, European Central Bank.
  16. Levine, Paul & Pearlman, Joseph & Pierse, Richard, 2008. "Linear-quadratic approximation, external habit and targeting rules," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(10), pages 3315-3349, October.
  17. Coenen, Günter, 2003. "Inflation persistence and robust monetary policy design," Working Paper Series 0290, European Central Bank.
  18. Adalid, Ramon & Coenen, Gunter & McAdam, Peter & Siviero, Stefano, 2005. "The Performance and Robustness of Interest-Rate Rules in Models of the Euro Area," MPRA Paper 821, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Richard Layard, 2006. "Happiness and Public Policy: a Challenge to the Profession," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(510), pages C24-C33, 03.
  20. Lars E.O. Svensson, 2002. "What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules," Working Papers 118, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
  21. Holtham, Gerald & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1992. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1043-51, September.
  22. Cogley, Timothy & Sargent, Thomas J., 2005. "The conquest of U.S. inflation: learning and robustness to model uncertainty," Working Paper Series 0478, European Central Bank.
  23. Levine, Paul, 2008. "Robust monetary rules under unstructured and structured model uncertainty," Working Paper Series 0899, European Central Bank.
  24. Lombardo, Giovanni & Vestin, David, 2007. "Welfare implications of Calvo vs. Rotemberg pricing assumptions," Working Paper Series 0770, European Central Bank.
  25. Levine, Paul, 1986. "The formulation of robust policies for rival rational expectations models of the economy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 10(1-2), pages 93-97, June.
  26. Frankel, Jeffrey A & Rockett, Katharine E, 1988. "International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 318-40, June.
  27. J. Tetlow, Robert & von zur Muehlen, Peter, 2001. "Robust monetary policy with misspecified models: Does model uncertainty always call for attenuated policy?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(6-7), pages 911-949, June.
  28. Choudhary, M. Ali & Levine, Paul, 2006. "Idle worship," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 77-83, January.
  29. DeJong, David N. & Ingram, Beth F. & Whiteman, Charles H., 2000. "A Bayesian approach to dynamic macroeconomics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 203-223, October.
  30. Eggertsson, Gauti B., 2006. "The Deflation Bias and Committing to Being Irresponsible," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(2), pages 283-321, March.
  31. Malcolm D. Knight & Chair, 2003. "Implications of a changing economic structure for the strategy of monetary policy," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 361-371.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20080870. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Official Publications)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.