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Optimal simple monetary policy rules and non-atomistic wage setters in a New-Keynesian framework

  • Gnocchi, Stefano

The purpose of the paper is to design optimal monetary policy rules in a New-Keynesian model featuring the presence of non-atomistic unions. It is shown that concentrated labor markets call for more aggressive inflation stabilization. This is because the central bank is able to induce wage restraint and to push output towards Pareto efficiency by implementing tougher stabilization policies. Moreover, the welfare cost of deviation from the optimal policy is increasing in wage setting centralization. The analysis is performed in the context of a linear-quadratic approach where the welfare measure is derived resorting to a second order approximation to households’ lifetime utility. JEL Classification: E24, E52

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Paper provided by European Central Bank in its series Working Paper Series with number 0690.

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Date of creation: Oct 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20060690
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  1. Pierpaolo Benigno & Michael Woodford, 2005. "Inflation Stabilization And Welfare: The Case Of A Distorted Steady State," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(6), pages 1185-1236, December.
  2. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:: Theory and some evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1395-1434, June.
  3. Richard Clarida & Jordi Galí & Mark Gertler, 1997. "The science of monetary policy: A new Keynesian perspective," Economics Working Papers 356, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 1999.
  4. Julio Rotemberg & Michael Woodford, 1997. "An Optimization-Based Econometric Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997, Volume 12, pages 297-361 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Stefano Gnocchi, 2009. "Non-Atomistic Wage Setters and Monetary Policy in a New Keynesian Framework," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(8), pages 1613-1630, December.
  6. Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker," CEPR Discussion Papers 2306, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Fabrizio Coricelli & Alex Cukierman & Alberto Dalmazzo, 2006. "Monetary Institutions, Monopolistic Competition, Unionized Labor Markets and Economic Performance," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(1), pages 39-63, 03.
  8. Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie & Uribe, Martín, 2001. "Solving Dynamic General Equilibrium Models Using a Second-Order Approximation to the Policy Function," CEPR Discussion Papers 2963, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Marc P. Giannoni & Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: I. General Theory," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000384, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
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