IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Transnational governance in global finance - the principles for stable capital flows and fair debt restructuring in emerging markets


  • Raymond Ritter


This paper analyses and assesses the track record and effectiveness of the so-called “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets”,which have emerged as an important instrument for crisis prevention and crisis resolution in the international financial system. The paper argues that, notwithstanding their low profile, the Principles which were jointly agreed between sovereign debtors and their private creditors in 2004 have proved to be an effective instrument in spite of their voluntary and nonbinding nature. Indeed, an increasing number of sovereign debtors and private creditors have adopted the Principles’ recommendations on transparency and the timely flow of information, close dialogue, “good faith” actions and fair treatment. Two elements have been critical to the success of the Principles: (i) their specific design feature as a soft mode of governance agreed by a transnational public-private partnership and (ii) the “hardening” after their launch in terms of precision and delegation, thus moving them somewhat along the continuum of soft law and hard law towards the latter. The paper also makes the case that the Principles and their design features can provide some lessons for the current international policy debate on codes of conduct in global financial regulation.. JEL Classification: F34, F51, F53, G15, G18.

Suggested Citation

  • Raymond Ritter, 2009. "Transnational governance in global finance - the principles for stable capital flows and fair debt restructuring in emerging markets," Occasional Paper Series 103, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbops:20090103

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. repec:bdi:opques:qef_143_01 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Nedelchev, Miroslav, 2015. "Coordination of banking regulation in the EU," MPRA Paper 66073, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2015.
    3. Marco Committeri & Francesco Spadafora, 2013. "You never give me your money? Sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 143, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

    More about this item


    Crisis prevention; debt restructuring; sovereign default; soft law; transnational public-private partnership; global financial governance.;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbops:20090103. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Official Publications). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.