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Central Bank Transparency in Theory and Practice

  • M. Demertzis
  • A. Hughes Hallet

We study the effects of Central Bank transparency on inflation and the output gap. We thus identify a small analytical model which concludes that transparency affects the variability of inflation and output and not their average levels. Then we examine whether this conjecture holds empirically, employing the recently derived index of transparency by Eijffinger and Geraats. The empirical findings confirm that the averages are not affected by transparency. It does seem to explain however, about 50% of the variability in inflation. The relation between transparency and output volatility is less clear but appears to be positive rather than negative.

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Paper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department in its series WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) with number 704.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:dnb:wormem:704
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  1. Muscatelli, Anton, 1998. "Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability through Independence?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 529-42, March.
  2. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, June.
  3. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Enrico Marchetti, 2004. "Central banks and information provided to the private sector," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 57(230), pages 265-295.
  4. Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2001. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 369-97, May.
  5. Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  6. Jakob Haan & Fabian Amtenbrink & Sandra Waller, 2004. "The Transparency and Credibility of the European Central Bank," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 775-794, November.
  7. Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O., 1999. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," Papers 669, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  8. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
  9. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Geraats, Petra M., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-21, March.
  10. Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. & Hoeberichts, Marco, 2000. "Central Bank accountability and transparency: theory and some evidence," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2000,06, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  11. Kenneth N. Kuttner & Adam S. Posen, 2000. "Inflation, Monetary Transparency, and G3 Exchange Rate Volatility," Working Paper Series WP00-6, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
  12. Cukierman, A., 2000. "Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem," Papers 2000-4, Tel Aviv.
  13. Lawrence J. Christiano & Terry J. Fitzgerald, 1999. "The Band pass filter," Working Paper 9906, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    • Lawrence J. Christiano & Terry J. Fitzgerald, 2003. "The Band Pass Filter," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(2), pages 435-465, 05.
  14. Kuttner, Kenneth N. & Posen, Adam S., 1999. "Does talk matter after all? Inflation targeting and central bank behavior," CFS Working Paper Series 1999/04, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  15. Henrik Jensen, . "Optimal Degrees of Tranaparency in Monetary Policymaking," EPRU Working Paper Series 01-01, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  16. Sibert, Anne, 2002. "Monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1093-1109, June.
  17. Christopher Allsopp, 2002. "Macroeconomic Policy Rules in Theory and in Practice," Discussion Papers 10, Monetary Policy Committee Unit, Bank of England.
  18. Warne Anders & Vredin Anders, 2006. "Unemployment and Inflation Regimes," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-52, May.
  19. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
  20. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 10, December.
  21. Melitz, Jacques, 1997. "Some Cross-Country Evidence about Debt, Deficits and the Behaviour of Monetary and Fiscal Authorities," CEPR Discussion Papers 1653, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. Charles Nolan & Eric Schaling, 1996. "Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Central Bank Accountability," Bank of England working papers 54, Bank of England.
  23. Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2003. "Three Models of Imperfect Transparency in Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 4117, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  24. Laurence Ball, 1999. "Aggregate demand and Long-Run Unemployment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 30(2), pages 189-252.
  25. Antulio N. Bomfim & Vincent Reinhart, 2000. "Making news: financial market effects of Federal Reserve disclosure practices," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2000-14, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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  27. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
  28. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:100:y:1985:i:4:p:1169-89 is not listed on IDEAS
  29. Otmar Issing, 1999. "The Eurosystem: Transparent andAccountable or 'Willem in Euroland'," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, 09.
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