Spillover of domestic regulation to emerging markets
Correlation between the risks of portfolios of different commercial banks leads to too much risk taking from a social planner's perspective. The presence of a regulator omproves this risk-benefit allocation of the financial system. In this paper I show that first-best regulation also leads to more attention for the fundamentals of countries to which capital is lent out.
|Date of creation:||2000|
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