Fiscal Restraints, ECB Credibility and the Stability Pact:A Game-Theoretic Perspective
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- Dornbusch, Rudi, 1997. "Fiscal Aspects of Monetary Integration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 221-223, May.
- Guy Debelle, 1996. "Central Bank Independence; A Free Lunch?," IMF Working Papers 96/1, .
- C.A. Sims, 1999. "The Precarious Fiscal Foundations of EMU," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 34, Netherlands Central Bank.
- Jensen, Henrik, 1996. "The advantage of international fiscal cooperation under alternative monetary regimes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 485-504, November.
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