Depositor and Investor Protection in the EU and the Netherlands: A Brief History
This paper provides some history of deposit insurance and investor protection in the Netherlands against the background of the history of such protection in the European Union, EU-legislation and the recent changes in the design of financial supervision in the Netherlands. It discusses how countries have responded to the EU-directives and to the changes in the financial environment. The main findings of the paper are the following. The Netherlands was among the first European countries to introduce deposit insurance. Deposit insurance systems in the EU are frequently funded ex post and offer lower coverage than systems in most other regions of the world. The system in the Netherlands shares these characteristics. Over time, all countries have adapted their systems in the spirit of the EU-directives on the matter, although it seems that some countries still need to undertake changes to comply with specific articles. During the 1990s, some convergence towards best practices has taken place. EU-regulation has obliged member countries to make their systems mandatory and there is a tendency towards ex ante funding and risk-related premiums. The the issues to be addressed by the Netherlands are whether to combine deposit and investor protection schemes, shift to ex ante funding partially or entirely and impose risk-adjusted charges. A follow-up paper will examine these issues further.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2003|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Postbus 98, 1000 AB Amsterdam|
Web page: http://www.dnb.nl/en/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Joke Mooij & Henriette Prast, 2003.
"A brief history of the institutional design of banking supervision in the Netherlands,"
Chapters,in: Banking Supervision at the Crossroads, chapter 2
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Joke Mooij & Henriette Prast, 2002. "A Brief History of the Institutional Design of Banking Supervision in the Netherlands," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 703, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Joke Mooij & Henriette Prast, 2002. "A Brief History of the Institutional Design of Banking Supervision in the Netherlands," Research Series Supervision (discontinued) 48, Netherlands Central Bank, Directorate Supervision.
- Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1998. "Optimal Financial Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1245-1284, 08.
- Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1976. "Optimal Financial Crises," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-01, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- G. G. Garcia, 2000. "Deposit Insurance; Actual and Good Practices," IMF Occasional Papers 197, International Monetary Fund.
- Gropp, Reint & Vesala, Jukka, 2001. "Deposit insurance and moral hazard: does the counterfactual matter?," Working Paper Series 0047, European Central Bank.
- Gropp, R. & Vesala, J., 2001. "Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard: Does the Counterfactual Matter?," Papers 47, Quebec a Montreal - Recherche en gestion.
- Asli DemirgÃ¼Ã§-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, 1998. "The Determinants of Banking Crises in Developing and Developed Countries," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(1), pages 81-109, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dnb:ressup:54. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rob Vet)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.