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Inside the Impossible Triangle:Monetary Policy Autonomy in a Credible Target Zone

  • W. Jos Jansen

This paper examines the trade-off between exchange rate stability and monetary autonomy for a target zone. Using the guilder-mark target zone in the pre-EMU period as a case study, we empirically estimate how much policy discretion the Dutch central bank still enjoyed and how much had been ceded to the German central bank. The sum of these two measures is an estimate of the policy autonomy under a free float. We find that the narrow guilder-mark target zone still permitted a modest degree of policy independence. This result suggests that intermediate exchange rate regimes may offer an attractive trade-off compared to the corner solutions (free float and monetary union), which is consistent with the 'fear of floating' phenomenon.

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File URL: http://www.dnb.nl/binaries/ms2003-13_tcm46-147343.pdf
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Paper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Monetary and Economic Policy Department in its series MEB Series (discontinued) with number 2003-13.

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Date of creation: Oct 2003
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Handle: RePEc:dnb:mebser:2003-13
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Web page: http://www.dnb.nl/en/

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  1. Sims, Christopher A., 1992. "Interpreting the macroeconomic time series facts : The effects of monetary policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 975-1000, June.
  2. Jon Faust & Eric M. Leeper, 1994. "When do long-run identifying restrictions give reliable results?," Working Paper 94-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  3. repec:dgr:kubcen:199670 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Lawrence J. Christiano & Martin Eichenbaum & Charles Evans, 1994. "The effects of monetary policy shocks: evidence from the flow of funds," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Apr.
  5. Guillermo A. Calvo & Carmen M. Reinhart, 2002. "Fear Of Floating," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(2), pages 379-408, May.
  6. Wyplosz, Charles, 1997. "EMU: Why and How It Might Happen," CEPR Discussion Papers 1685, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Svensson, Lars E O, 1992. "Why Exchange Rate Bands? Monetary Independence in Spite of Fixed Exchange Rates," CEPR Discussion Papers 742, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Frank A.G. den Butter & Robert H.J. Mosch, 2003. "The Dutch Miracle: Institutions, Networks, and Trust," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 362-, June.
  9. Maurice Obstfeld, 1999. "EMU: Ready, or Not?," NBER Working Papers 6682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Jeffrey A. Frankel & Sergio L. Schmukler & Luis Serven, 2002. "Global Transmission of Interest Rates: Monetary Independence and Currency Regime," NBER Working Papers 8828, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 1995. "The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates," NBER Working Papers 5191, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," NBER Working Papers 5146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Maurice Obstfeld & Jay C. Shambaugh & Alan M. Taylor, 2005. "The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs Among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 423-438, August.
  14. Martin Feldstein, 1997. "The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 23-42, Fall.
  15. Kumah, F.Y., 1996. "The Effect of Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates : How to Solve the Puzzles," Discussion Paper 1996-70, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  16. Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 1997. "The role of banks in monetary policy: a survey with implications for the European Monetary Union," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Sep, pages 2-18.
  17. Garretsen, Harry & Swank, Job, 1998. "The Transmission of Interest Rate Changes and the Role of Bank Balance Sheets: A VAR-Analysis for the Netherlands," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 325-339, April.
  18. Jeffrey Frankel & Sergio Schmukler & Luis Serven, 2000. "Verifiability and the Vanishing Intermediate Exchange Rate Regime," NBER Working Papers 7901, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Ramana Ramaswamy & Torsten Sløk, 1998. "The Real Effects of Monetary Policy in the European Union: What Are the Differences?," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(2), pages 374-396, June.
  20. Fank Smets, 1997. "Measuring Monetary Policy Shocks in France, Germany and Italy: The Role of The Exchange Rate," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 133(III), pages 597-616, September.
  21. Fratzscher, Marcel, 2002. "The Euro bloc, the Dollar bloc and the Yen bloc: how much monetary policy independence can exchange rate flexibility buy in an interdependent world?," Working Paper Series 0154, European Central Bank.
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