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The role of regional information in the optimal composition of a committee

  • Philipp Maier
  • Beata Bierut
  • Robert-Paul Berben

We analyse the optimal composition of a federal or supra-national committee. The representation of regional (national) entities in federal committees is typically motivated by their superior knowledge of local conditions. Using this argument, we formally model the optimal composition of a committee. Our results indicate that a region's representation in a federal committee depends on its ability to reduce uncertainty about the state of the economy. Furthermore, correlation of regional uncertainty increases the value of information. This induces synergy effects, which result in higher optimal representation in the committee.

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File URL: http://www.dnb.nl/binaries/ms2003-08_tcm46-147338.pdf
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Paper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Monetary and Economic Policy Department in its series MEB Series (discontinued) with number 2003-08.

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Date of creation: Aug 2003
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Handle: RePEc:dnb:mebser:2003-08
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Web page: http://www.dnb.nl/en/

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  1. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1999. "The role of a regional bank in a system of central banks," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 51-71, December.
  2. Bottazzi, Laura & Manasse, Paolo, 2002. "Asymmetric Information and Monetary Policy in Common Currency Areas," CEPR Discussion Papers 3484, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Casella, Alessandra, 1992. "Participation in a Currency Union," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 847-63, September.
  4. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  5. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-77, August.
  6. Ellen E. Meade & D. Nathan Sheets, 2002. "Regional influences on U.S. monetary policy: some implications for Europe," International Finance Discussion Papers 721, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  7. Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Federal Monetary Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 422, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Helge Berger, 2002. "The ECB and Euro-Area Enlargement," IMF Working Papers 02/175, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Ullrich, Katrin, 2004. "Decision-Making of the ECB: Reform and Voting Power," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-70, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  10. M.A. Akhtar & Howard Howe, 1991. "The political and institutional independence of U.S. monetary policy," Research Paper 9110, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  11. Friedrich Heinemann & Felix P. Huefner, 2004. "Is The View From The Eurotower Purely European? - National Divergence And Ecb Interest Rate Policy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 51(4), pages 544-558, 09.
  12. von Hagen, Jurgen & Suppel, Ralph, 1994. "Central bank constitutions for federal monetary unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 774-782, April.
  13. Nout Wellink & Bryan Chapple & Philipp Maier, 2002. "The role of national central banks within the European System of Central Banks: The example of De Nederlandsche Bank," Macroeconomics 0207006, EconWPA.
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