Macroeconomic Policy Co-ordination in the Euro Area
This paper reviews the rationale for co-ordination of macroeconomic policies in the euro area. It makes clear what co-ordination can do and what it cannot do in European practice. It concludes that with the Pact for Stability and Growth, the framework for co-ordination of fiscal policies has by and large been completed. As regards co-ordination of structural policies the implementation and review process should be strengthened. The optimal form of policy co-ordination in this field will differ from case to case. With regard to the policy mix, only an exchange of information and analyses will improve policy-making, as more far-reaching forms of co-ordination will annul the benefits of functional separation.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2000|
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