The 'Wisdom of the Crowds' and Public Policy
Surowiecki (2004) argues that collective predictions are better than individual predictions and calls that the Wisdom of the Crowds. We use an analytical information model to demonstrate and explain this. Then we see how these two predictions are affected by better public information and show that while individual predictions always improve, collective ones do not. A social planner that relies on collective predictions to form policy may erroneously refrain from providing better information. We use two examples to show where this might be applicable.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Postbus 98, 1000 AB Amsterdam|
Web page: http://www.dnb.nl/en/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Maria Demertzis & Marco Hoeberichts, 2006.
"The Costs of Increasing Transparency,"
DNB Working Papers
080, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Maria Demertzis & Nicola Viegi, 2005.
"Inflation Targets as Focal Points,"
Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005
52, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
- Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:203. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rob Vet)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.