Let Me Vote! An Experimental Study of the Effects of Vote Rotation in Committees
We conduct an experiment to investigate (i) whether rotation in voting increases a committee's efficiency, and (ii) the extent to which rotation is likely to critically influence collective and individual welfare. The experiment is based on the idea that voters have to trade-off individual versus common interests. Our findings indicate that the choice of a rotation scheme has important consequences: it 'pays' to be allowed to vote, as voting committee members earn significantly more than non-voting members. Hence, rotation is not neutral. We also find that smaller committees decide faster and block fewer decisions. This reduces frustration among committee members.
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