How does cross-border collateral affect a country's central bank and prudential supervisor?
Although - partly as a result of the financial crisis - central banks are increasingly inclined to accept foreign collateral, it is hard to find analyses dealing explicitly with the consequences of such collateral for a country's central bank and supervisor. The scientific literature on this issue is thin on the ground, Manning and Willison (2006) being an exception . Policy forums, too, have paid little attention to this subject. The BIS Cross-border collateral arrangements report (BIS, 2006), which focuses on the operational arrangements to facilitate the cross-border use of collateral, is the only one to deal explicitly though scantily with the relationship between foreign collateral and central bank tasks. The IMF (IMF, 2008) provides a sound general overview of central banks' collateral frameworks, but does not look into the relationship between foreign collateral and the task of a central bank cum supervisor.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2009|
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