How does cross-border collateral affect a country's central bank and prudential supervisor?
Although - partly as a result of the financial crisis - central banks are increasingly inclined to accept foreign collateral, it is hard to find analyses dealing explicitly with the consequences of such collateral for a country's central bank and supervisor. The scientific literature on this issue is thin on the ground, Manning and Willison (2006) being an exception. Policy forums, too, have paid little attention to this subject. The BIS Cross-border collateral arrangements report (BIS, 2006), which focuses on the operational arrangements to facilitate the cross-border use of collateral, is the only one to deal explicitly though scantily with the relationship between foreign collateral and central bank tasks. The IMF (IMF, 2008) provides a sound general overview of central banks' collateral frameworks, but does not look into the relationship between foreign collateral and the task of a central bank cum supervisor.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2009|
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