The effects of industry structure and yardstick design on strategic behavior with yardstick competition: an experimental study
We present an experiment on yardstick competition. Experimental firms set cost levels in each period and can communicate with each other in an attempt to increase the regulated price. We find that when market shares are heterogeneous, collusion is least frequent and prices are lowest. The number of players on a market also infuences prices, but to a lesser extent. Comparing across yardsticks, the discriminatory yardstick yields the lowest prices, while a best-practice yardstick yields the highest prices.
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- Potters, J.J.M. & Rockenbach, B. & Sadrieh, A. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2004.
"Collusion under yardstick competition : An experimental study,"
Other publications TiSEM
2f5fc044-063c-477d-bf98-d, School of Economics and Management.
- Potters, Jan & Rockenbach, Bettina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & van Damme, Eric, 2004. "Collusion under yardstick competition: an experimental study," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 1017-1038, September.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M. & Rockenbach, B. & Sadrieh, A., 2003. "Collusion under Yardstick Competition : An Experimental Study," Discussion Paper 2003-009, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Potters, J.J.M. & Rockenbach, B. & Sadrieh, A. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2003. "Collusion under Yardstick Competition : An Experimental Study," Discussion Paper 2003-97, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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- repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-141666 is not listed on IDEAS
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