Delegation in a group-contest
It is known that the option of delegation in a rent-seeking contest between two individuals leads to a prisoner’s dilemma. In equilibrium no player hires a delegate, while it is Pareto-efficient if both would hire one. This paper shows that this result does not generalize to a contest between the members of two groups. We further provide the conditions under which zero, one, or both groups hire a delegate in equilibrium.
|Date of creation:||2002|
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- Lambert Schoonbeek, 2002. "A delegated agent in a winner-takes-all contest," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 21-23.
- Warneryd, Karl, 2000.
"In Defense of Lawyers: Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 145-158, October.
- Wärneryd, Karl, 1996. "In Defense of Lawyers. Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 126, Stockholm School of Economics.
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