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Who supported the Deutsche Bundesbank? : an empirical investigation

  • Maier, Philipp
  • Knaap, Thijs

    (Groningen University)

Abstract The relevance of public support for monetary policy has largely been overlooked in the empirical central bank literature. We have constructed a new indicator for the support of the German Bundesbank and present descriptive and empirical evidence. We nd that major German interest groups were quite heterogeneous in judging a given policy stance. Empirically, we show that (a) public support can (at least partly) oset pressure from other organized groups and (b) accounting for popular support of the central bank allows to make more accurate forecasts of the short-term interest rate.

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File URL: http://irs.ub.rug.nl/ppn/241234638
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Paper provided by University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research in its series CCSO Working Papers with number 200108.

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Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:rugccs:200108
Contact details of provider: Postal: PO Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen
Phone: +31 50 363 7185
Fax: +31 50 363 3720
Web page: http://ccso.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/Email:


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  1. Bernhard Winkler, 1999. "Is Maastricht a Good Contract?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 39-58, 03.
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  7. Froyen, Richard T. & Havrilesky, Thomas & Waud, Roger N., 1997. "The Asymmetric Effects of Political Pressures on U.S. Monetary Policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 471-493, July.
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  9. de Haan, Jakob & van 't Hag, Gert Jan, 1995. " Variation in Central Bank Independence across Countries: Some Provisional Empirical Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 335-51, December.
  10. Richard Clarida & Mark Gertler, 1996. "How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 5581, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Adam S. Posen, 1995. "Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 253-274 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Andrew C. Harvey, 1990. "The Econometric Analysis of Time Series, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 026208189x, June.
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  14. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, June.
  15. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
  16. Frey, Bruno S. & Schneider, Friedrich, 1981. "Central bank behavior : A positive empirical analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 291-315.
  17. Hayo, Bernd, 1998. "Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 241-263, May.
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