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Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information : Some Open Problems

  • Forges, Françoise
  • Serrano, Roberto

This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in non-cooperative Bayesian games.

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File URL: http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/123456789/8158/1/2011-15_paper.pdf
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Paper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/8158.

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Date of creation: Jun 2013
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Publication status: Published in International Game Theory Review, 2013, Vol. 15, no. 2
Handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/8158
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html

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  1. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  2. Ray, Debraj, 2007. "A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199207954, March.
  3. Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2010. "A commitment folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 127-137, May.
  4. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission In Coalitional Voting Games," Economics Working Papers we055726, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  5. F. Forges & A. Heifetz & E. Minelli, 1999. "Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies," THEMA Working Papers 99-06, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  6. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 2001. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1685-1696, November.
  7. Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Papers 21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  8. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
  9. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May.
  10. Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  11. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September.
  12. Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1767-97, November.
  13. Roger B. Myerson, 1982. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Infonnation," Discussion Papers 527, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2004-18, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  15. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Minelli, Enrico, 2004. "Two-person bargaining with verifiable information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 799-813, November.
  16. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Incentives and incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  17. Forges, Françoise & Biran, Omer, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4100, Paris Dauphine University.
  18. Roger Myerson, 2004. "Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 659, Econometric Society.
  19. DE CLIPPEL, Geoffroy, 2002. "Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: an eloquent example," CORE Discussion Papers 2002014, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  20. Okada, Akira, 2009. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core," Discussion Papers 2009-03, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  21. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  22. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2010. "Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(1), pages 7-33, 03.
  23. Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2000. "Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 527-535, December.
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