Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation
Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria are useful notions to understand the strategic effects of information and communication. Between these two models, a protocol generates information through communication. We define a secure protocol as a protocol from which no individual may have strategic incentives to deviate and characterize these protocols.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 1998, Vol. 83, no. 1. pp. 69-89.Length: 20 pages|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html|
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