On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling
We consider two-person undiscounted repeated games with lack of information on one side and state-independent signalling and prove the existence of a "joint plan" uniform equilibrium.
|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2000, Vol. 25, no. 4. pp. 552-572.Length: 20 pages|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html|
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