Repeated Communication Through the Mechanism And
We consider the “and” communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are allowed.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, Vol. 30, no. 1. pp. 41-60.Length: 19 pages|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html|
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