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Repeated Communication Through the Mechanism And

  • Gossner, Olivier
  • Vieille, Nicolas
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    We consider the “and” communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are allowed.

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    File URL: http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/123456789/6031/2/RepeatedAnd.pdf
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    Paper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/6031.

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    Date of creation: 2001
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    Publication status: Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, Vol. 30, no. 1. pp. 41-60.Length: 19 pages
    Handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/6031
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html

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    1. Gossner, Olivier, 1998. "Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 69-89, November.
    2. Ehud Lehrer & Sylvain Sorin, 1994. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Discussion Papers 1108, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November.
    4. Lehrer, Ehud, 1991. "Internal Correlation in Repeated Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 431-56.
    5. Lehrer, Ehud, 1996. "Mediated Talk," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 177-88.
    6. FORGES, Françoise, . "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP -914, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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