Repeated Communication Through the Mechanism And
We consider the “and” communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are allowed.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, Vol. 30, no. 1. pp. 41-60.Length: 19 pages|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gossner, Olivier, 1998.
"Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 69-89, November.
- GOSSNER, Olivier, 1997. "Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation," CORE Discussion Papers 1997092, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Forges, Francoise M, 1986.
"An Approach to Communication Equilibria,"
Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November.
- F. Forges, 2010. "An Approach to Communication Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 516, David K. Levine.
- Forges, F., 1984. "An approach to communication equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 1984035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- FORGES, FranÃ§oise, . "An approach to communication equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP 721, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Ehud Lehrer & Sylvain Sorin, 1994.
"One-Shot Public Mediated Talk,"
1108, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ehud Lehrer, 1988.
"Internal Correlation in Repeated Games,"
800, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- FORGES,Â FranÃ§oise, .
CORE Discussion Papers RP
914, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Lehrer, Ehud, 1996. "Mediated Talk," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 177-88.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/6031. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandre Faure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.