Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games
We study the existence of uniform correlated equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games. The correlation devices that we use are either autonomous (they base their choice of signal on previous signals, but not on previous states or actions) or stationary (their choice is independent of any data and is drawn according to the same probability distribution at every stage). We prove that any n-player stochastic game admits an autonomous correlated equilibrium payoff. When the game is positive and recursive, a stationary correlated equilibrium payoff exists.
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|Date of creation:||2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, Vol. 38, no. 2. pp. 362-399.Length: 37 pages|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html|
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