Remittances and poverty : Who benefits in the household ?
We use data from a newly designed household survey in Senegal to study intrahousehold allocation of remittances income. In this survey, households are split between sub-groups of individuals, in a way that is natural to households and that corresponds to the internal budgetary arrangements found in the extended families of Senegal. We find that remittances accruing to specific individuals in the household are not completely fungible with other sources of income. In particular the school enrolment of children aged 7 to 13 is found to depend on remittances income accruing to the sub-group he/she belongs to and not on the remittances accruing to other sub-groups. Looking at total expenditures, we also find that transfers received by a sub-group are a significant determinant of its own consumption, contrarily to transfers received by other groups. This is not true for food consumption, suggesting that households tend to satisfy the basic needs of all their members.
|Date of creation:||May 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html|
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Stefan Dercon, 2000.
"Income risk, coping strategies and safety nets,"
Economics Series Working Papers
WPS/2000-26, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Stefan Dercon, 2000. "Income risk, coping strategies and safety nets," CSAE Working Paper Series 2000-26, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Dercon, Stefan, 2002. "Income Risk, Coping Strategies and Safety Nets," Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Rosenzweig, Mark R, 1988.
"Risk, Implicit Contracts and the Family in Rural Areas of Low-income Countries,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(393), pages 1148-70, December.
- Rosenzweig, Mark R., 1986. "Risk, Implicit Contracts and the Family in Rural Areas of Low-Income Countries," Bulletins 7518, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Alice Mesnard, 2004. "Temporary migration and capital market imperfections," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 242-262, April.
- Stark, Oded & Taylor, J. Edward & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1988. "Migration, remittances and inequality : A sensitivity analysis using the extended Gini index," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 309-322, May.
- Morduch, Jonathan, 1999. "Between the State and the Market: Can Informal Insurance Patch the Safety Net?," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 14(2), pages 187-207, August.
- Richard H. Adams, Jr. & John Page, 2003. "International migration, remittances, and poverty in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3179, The World Bank.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/5837. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandre Faure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.