IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Education obligatoire en prèsence d'évasion fiscale

  • Arestoff, Florence
  • Jacques, Jean-François
Registered author(s):

    Cet article défend l'idée selon laquelle une scolarisation minimale obligatoire peut constituer un complément efficace à une taxe qui financerait l'éducation en présence d'évasion fiscale. Nous construisons un modèle à générations d'agents dans lequel deux régimes d'éducation sont définis. Le premier est privé en l'absence d'état et le second est public. Dans le régime privé, les agents financent l'éducation via un transfert de bien à l'école. Dans le régime public, l'État collecte des impôts pour financer l'éducation. Pour déterminer le taux d'imposition optimal, l'État considère qu'un enfant est un futur parent. A l'État stationnaire, le régime public est donc Pareto améliorant car l'État prend en compte l'inefficacité intergénérationelle, l'altruisme des parents vis ‡ vis des enfants étant imparfait. Quand nous comparons le taux d'imposition avec le taux d'investissement privé en Éducation, le premier est naturellement optimal au sens de Pareto à l'État stationnaire. Or, sachant que dans les pays en développement plus qu'ailleurs, une large part des revenus ne sont pas déclarés, l'hypothèse d'un gouvernement disposant d'une information complète sur les revenus de la population n'est pas satisfaisante. Nous proposons alors un optimum de premier rang dans lequel, en termes de bien-être, le régime public ne peut dominer le régime privé que si le gouvernement impose une durée d'études minimale.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/123456789/5552/1/14BC9C08d01.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/5552.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: May 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/5552
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html

    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1996. "Public Provision of Private Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 57-84, February.
    2. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E., 1996. "Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 297-325, November.
    3. Raffinot, Marc & Marouani, Mohamed Ali & Günther, Isabel, 2007. "La croissance pro-pauvres au Mali," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/1241, Paris Dauphine University.
    4. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470 Elsevier.
    5. Saint-Paul, G. & Verdier, T., 1991. "Education, Democracy and growth," DELTA Working Papers 91-27, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    6. World Bank, 2007. "World Development Indicators 2007," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 8150, May.
    7. Yoram Ben-Porath, 1967. "The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of Earnings," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75, pages 352.
    8. Barham, V. & Boadway, R. & Marchand, M. & Pestieau, P., . "Education and the poverty trap," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1173, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    9. Paul A. Samuelson, 1958. "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66, pages 467.
    10. Fernandez, Raquel & Rogerson, Richard, 1995. "On the Political Economy of Education Subsidies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 249-62, April.
    11. Azariadis, Costas & Drazen, Allan, 1990. "Threshold Externalities in Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 501-26, May.
    12. Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B, 1992. "Public versus Private Investment in Human Capital Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 818-34, August.
    13. Glomm, Gerhard, 1997. "Parental choice of human capital investment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 99-114, June.
    14. Gary S. Becker & Nigel Tomes, 1976. "Child Endowments, and the Quantity and Quality of Children," NBER Working Papers 0123, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Behrman, Jere R & Pollak, Robert A & Taubman, Paul, 1982. "Parental Preferences and Provision for Progeny," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(1), pages 52-73, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/5552. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandre Faure)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.