IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Political Contributions to Influence Consumers: the Example of the U.S. Drug Reimportation Debate

  • Boring, Anne

To reduce pharmaceutical prices, some legislators have been trying to pass bills authorizing the reimportation of prescription drugs to the United States. Pharmaceutical companies oppose reimportation, by elaborating a message (foreign drugs are of lower quality than domestic drugs) to influence legislators and their constituents. The industry gives contributions to legislators to spread its anti-reimportation message. The amount it gives depends on legislators’ and constituents’ characteristics. The legislators who receive the most are those whose constituents are most likely to oppose reimports. _________________________________ Afin de réduire les prix des produits pharmaceutiques, des législateurs tentent depuis plusieurs années de faire passer des lois qui autoriseraient la ré-importation de médicaments aux Etats-Unis. Les entreprises pharmaceutiques s’opposent aux ré-importations en élaborant un argument pour influencer les législateurs et leurs électeurs. Ici, l’argument est que les médicaments vendus à l’étranger sont de moins bonne qualité que ceux vendus aux Etats- Unis. L’industrie pharmaceutique finance les législateurs américains pour diffuser ce message contre les ré-importations. Le montant qu’elle donne dépend des caractéristiques des législateurs et de leurs électeurs. Les législateurs qui reçoivent le plus de financement sont ceux dont les électeurs ont le plus de chances d’être opposés aux ré-importations.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/123456789/4296/1/2010-03.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/4296.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in DIAL Document de travail, 2010
Handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/4296
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade 0503003, EconWPA.
  3. Stephen Coate, 2004. "Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 772-804, 09.
  4. Omer Gokcekus & Mike Adams & Henry Grabowski & Edward Tower, 2006. "How Did The 2003 Prescription Drug Re-Importation Bill Pass The House?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 27-45, 03.
  5. Wright, Donald J., 2004. "The drug bargaining game: pharmaceutical regulation in Australia," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 785-813, July.
  6. Choi, E. Kwan & Harrigan, James, 2003. "Handbook of International Trade," Staff General Research Papers 11375, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  7. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
  8. Valérie Paris & Elizabeth Docteur, 2006. "Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Policies in Canada," OECD Health Working Papers 24, OECD Publishing.
  9. Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-87, December.
  10. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June.
  11. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
  12. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Special Interest Politics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262571676, June.
  13. Baldwin, Robert E & Magee, Christopher S, 2000. " Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 79-101, October.
  14. Anis, Aslam H. & Wen, Quan, 1998. "Price regulation of pharmaceuticals in Canada," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 21-38, January.
  15. Bresnahan, Timothy F, 1987. "Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: The 1955 Price War," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 457-82, June.
  16. Wright John, 2004. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting on Tobacco Policy, 1980-2000," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(3), pages 1-28, December.
  17. Levitt, Steven D, 1994. "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 777-98, August.
  18. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/4296. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandre Faure)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.