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Transformation Risk, Inefficiency of the Legal System and Financial Dualism in Developing Countries

  • Bernard, Philippe
  • Venet, Baptiste
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    Developing countries economies are well-known for both the inadequacy of the institutional framework (this is particularly relevant for the legal system) and the presence of informal nancing. The former characteristic signi cantly reduces the e¢ ciency of con- tractual mechanisms. As a result, the importance of transformation risk increases. Such a context induces entrepreneurs and lenders to implement some new non-contractual mechanisms. The diversity of monitoring techniques as well as the heterogeneity of borrowers initial endowments and investment projects lead to an endogenous nancial dualism. Borrowers choose formal or informal nancing according to the quality of their investment project, their initial wealth and to the efficiency of the legal system.

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    Paper provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/3515.

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    Date of creation: Jun 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/3515
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    9. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Which Capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian Crisis," CRSP working papers 486, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
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