Unveiling information on opportunity costs in REDD: Who obtains the surplus when policy objectives differ?
Improving information about individual opportunity costs of deforestation agents has the potential to increase the efficiency of REDD when it takes the form of a payment for environmental services scheme. However, objectives pursued in REDD projects may vary across policy makers. Within a theoretical framework, this paper explores the impacts of different policy objectives under two opportunity cost settings: asymmetric and full information. For a policy maker aiming to maximize net income from REDD, having full information may not increase the amount of forest conserved but could lead to a redistribution of rents away from agents. By contrast, for an environmental policy maker focused on maximizing the amount of forest conserved under REDD having full information increases the amount of forest conserved while reducing the rents received by agents. For a policy maker pursuing poverty alleviation objectives in REDD-affected communities, having full information makes no difference to overall welfare as rents remain with agents. The amount of deforestation avoided will at least be as high as under asymmetric information. These results are illustrated with data collected on opportunity costs in Amazonas State, Brazil.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||May 2014|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Resource and Energy Economics, 2014, Vol. 36, no. 2|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Solenn Leplay & Jonah Busch & Philippe Delacote & Sophie Thoyer, 2011. "Implementation of national and international REDD mechanism under alternative payments for environemtal services: theory and illustration from Sumatra," Working Papers 11-02, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2011.
- Groom, Ben & Palmer, Charles, 2010. "Cost-effective provision of environmental services: the role of relaxing market constraints," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(02), pages 219-240, April.
- Ian A. MacKenzie & Markus Ohndorf & Charles Palmer, 2010. "Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring ï¿½permanenceï¿½ in carbon sequestration," GRI Working Papers 27, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
- Muller, Jeffrey & Albers, Heidi J., 2004. "Enforcement, payments, and development projects near protected areas: how the market setting determines what works where," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 185-204, June.
- Signe ANTHON & Peter BOGETOFT & Bo Jellesmark THORSEN, 2007. "A Bureaucrat'S Procurement Strategy: Budget Constraints And Rationing," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 78(2), pages 221-244, 06.
- JunJie Wu & David Zilberman & Bruce A. Babcock, 1999.
"Environmental and Distributional Impacts of Conservation Targeting Strategies,"
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications
99-wp230, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
- Wu, JunJie & Zilberman, David & Babcock, Bruce A., 2001. "Environmental and Distributional Impacts of Conservation Targeting Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 333-350, May.
- Wu, JunJie & Zilberman, David & Babcock, Bruce A., 2001. "Environmental and Distributional Impacts of Conservation Targeting Strategies," Staff General Research Papers 1931, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Dutschke, Michael & Schlamadinger, Bernhard & Wong-Leung, Jenny P. & Rumberg, Michael, 2004. "Value and Risks of Expiring Carbon Credits from CDM Afforestation and Reforestation," HWWA Discussion Papers 290, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
- Pagiola, Stefano & Bosquet, Benoit, 2009. "Estimating the costs of REDD at the country level," MPRA Paper 13726, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ferraro, Paul J., 2008. "Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 810-821, May.
- JunJie Wu & Bruce A. Babcock, 1996.
"Contract Design for the Purchase of Environmental Goods from Agriculture,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(4), pages 935-945.
- Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1996. "Contract Design for the Purchase of Environmental Goods from Agriculture," Staff General Research Papers 1050, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Wunder, Sven & Engel, Stefanie & Pagiola, Stefano, 2008. "Taking stock: A comparative analysis of payments for environmental services programs in developed and developing countries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 834-852, May.
- Anthon, Signe & Bogetoft, Peter & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark, 2007. "Socially optimal procurement with tight budgets and rationing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1625-1642, August.
- Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1995.
"Optimal Design Of A Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information,"
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 20(02), December.
- JunJie Wu & Bruce A. Babcock, 1995. "Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 95-wp131, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
- Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1995. "Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information," Staff General Research Papers 843, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Börner, Jan & Wunder, Sven & Wertz-Kanounnikoff, Sheila & Tito, Marcos Rügnitz & Pereira, Ligia & Nascimento, Nathalia, 2010. "Direct conservation payments in the Brazilian Amazon: Scope and equity implications," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(6), pages 1272-1282, April.
- Bulte, Erwin H. & Lipper, Leslie & Stringer, Randy & Zilberman, David, 2008. "Payments for ecosystem services and poverty reduction: concepts, issues, and empirical perspectives," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(03), pages 245-254, June.
- Palmer, Charles, 2011. "Property rights and liability for deforestation under REDD+: Implications for 'permanence' in policy design," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 571-576, February.
- Gary Stoneham & Vivek Chaudhri & Arthur Ha & Loris Strappazzon, 2003. "Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 47(4), pages 477-500, December.
- Muñoz-Piña, Carlos & Guevara, Alejandro & Torres, Juan Manuel & Braña, Josefina, 2008. "Paying for the hydrological services of Mexico's forests: Analysis, negotiations and results," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 725-736, May.
- Charles Palmer, 2005. "The Nature of Corruption in Forest Management," World Economics, World Economics, Economic & Financial Publishing, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 6(2), pages 1-10, April.
- Carmen Arguedas & Daan Soest, 2011. "Optimal Conservation Programs, Asymmetric Information and the Role of Fixed Costs," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(2), pages 305-323, October.
- Asquith, Nigel M. & Vargas, Maria Teresa & Wunder, Sven, 2008. "Selling two environmental services: In-kind payments for bird habitat and watershed protection in Los Negros, Bolivia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 675-684, May.
- Amacher, Gregory S., 2006. "Corruption: A challenge for economists interested in forest policy design," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 85-89, June.
- Richard D. Horan & Roger Claassen, 2007. "Targeting Green Payments under a Budget Constraint," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 83(3), pages 319-330.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/12951. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandre Faure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.