Status and incentives
The paper introduces status as re ecting an agent's claim to recognition in her work. It is a scarce resource: increasing an agent's status requires that another agent's status is decreased. Higher status agents are more willing to exert e ort in exchange for money; better-paid agents would exert a higher e ort in exchange for an improved status. Results are coherent with actual management practices: (i) egalitarianism is desirable in a static context; (ii) in a long-term work relationship, juniors' compensations are delayed; past performances are recompensed by pay increases along with an improved status within the organization's hierarchy.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in RAND Journal of Economics, 2008, Vol. 39, no. 1. pp. 305-326.Length: 21 pages|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html|
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