Les contrats pour évaluer le droit : Quelques propositions méthodologiques fondées sur l'analyse du Droit des brevets et des Contrats de licences de technologie
This paper presents a new methodology aimed at building institutional indicators. Up to now, all the available indicators have relied on an analysis of the supply of legal protection. Conversely we propose here a methodology based on the analysis of the demand for legal protection, as it is revealed by the choices of economic agents when designing contractual agreements, and which is inspired by Oaxaca's approach of discrimination on labor market . We rely on Transaction Cost Economics to analyze how agents design specific contractual clauses given the institutional environment. Observed differences between contracts established in contrasted institutional environments can then be interpreted as differences resulting from the later, if appropriate control variables are taken into account. We provide also an illustration based on a database of international licensing agreements developed with the French Patent office (INPI). As a main result, we highlight a stronger protection of intellectual property in Germany than in the us, as well as the weaknesses of the Japanese institutional framework on this ground.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Revue économique, 2007, Vol. 58, no. 6. pp. 1363-1386.Length: 23 pages|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html|
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/12333. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandre Faure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.