Communication and Binary Decisions: Is it Better to Communicate?
We study information transmission between informed experts and an uninformed decision-maker who only takes binary decisions. In the single expert case, we show that information transmission can only be relatively poor. Hence, even sophiscated communication games do not yield equilibria which (ex ante) outperform delegation. Referring to multiple experts allow the decision-maker to obtain more information. However, this information can never be perfect, and sophisticated communication games, for instance with multilateral, multistage communication, do not outperform simple communication methods.
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|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in JITE : Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2013, Vol. 169, no. 3. pp. 451-467.Length: 16 pages|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html|
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