A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
The set of all Bayesian–Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional commitments at the interim stage of a Bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, the various equilibrium payoffs, which are achieved by means of different commitment devices, are also the equilibrium payoffs of a universal, deterministic commitment game.
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|Date of creation:||Mar 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, Vol. 78, no. 1. pp. 64-71.Length: 7 pages|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html|
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