Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Inter-Generational Games: An Experimental Study
This is a paper on the creation and evolution of conventions of behavior in "inter-generational games". In these games a sequence of nonoverlapping "generations" of players play a stage game for a finite number of periods and are then replaced by other agents who continue the game in their role for an identical length of time. Players in generation t are allowed to see the history of the game played by all (or some subset) of the generations who played it before them and can communicate with their successors in generation t+1 and advise them on how they should behave. What we find is that word-of-mouth social learning (in the form of advice from laboratory "parents" to laboratory "children") can be a strong force in the creation of social conventions, far stronger than the type of learning subjects seem capable of doing simply by learning the lessons of history without the guidance o¥ered by such advice.
|Date of creation:||2001|
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- Schotter, A. & Sopher, B., 2000.
"Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Inter-Generational Games: An Experiment in Lamarckian Evolutionary Dynamics,"
00-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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- Nyarko, Yaw & Schotter, Andrew, 1998. "An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Real Beliefs," Working Papers 98-39, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1989. "Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 568-587, Winter.
- Bisin, Alberto & Verdier, Thierry, 1998. "Cultural Transmission, Marriage and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits," Working Papers 98-40, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Vega-Redondo, Fernando (ed.), 1996. "Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198774723, July.
- Salant, David J., 1991. "A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 244-259, May.
- H. Peyton Young, 1996. "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 105-122, Spring.
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