Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, But Does That Matter?
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- Bossert, Walter & Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2002. "Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-202, August.
- Bossert, W. & Brams, S.J. & Kilgour, D.M., 2000. "Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?," Cahiers de recherche 2000-15, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- BOSSERT, Walter & BRAMS, Steven J. & KILGOUR, D. Marc, 2000. "Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?," Cahiers de recherche 2000-15, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
References listed on IDEAS
- Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 1998. "Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 263-289.
- Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Mark, 1997. "The Truel," Working Papers 97-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 1998.
"Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, pages 263-289.
- Kilgour, D.M. & Brams, S.J., 1996. "Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Working Papers 96-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- David Rietzke & Brian Roberson, 2013.
"The robustness of ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliances,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 937-956, April.
- David Rietzke & Brian Roberson, 2010. "The Robustness of ‘Enemy-of-My-Enemy-is-My-Friend’ Alliances," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1258, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsCOOPERATIVE GAME; NON-COOPERATIVE GAME; TRUEL; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; CORE;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
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