A scheme of plain conversation is constructed, which is a universal mechanism for all noncooperative games with incomplete information with at least four players, in the following sense: every solution that can be achieved by means of an arbitrary communication mechanism is a correlated equilibrium payoff of the game extended by the scheme of plain conversation. By a property of the correlated equilibrium, a similar result holds also with the Nash equilibrium solution concept. The universal mechanism can be used without any loss of efficiency. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.
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|Note:||In : Econometrica, 58(6), 1341-1364, 1990|
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