Equilibria with communication in a job market example
The authors study (costless) information transmission from a job applicant to an employer who must decide whether to hire him and, if so, which position to give him. The author constructs equilibrium payoffs requiring at least two signaling steps, or even that no deadline be imposed on the (plain) conversation. The set of communication equilibrium payoffs (achieved with the help of a communication device) is larger than the set of equilibrium payoffs of the plain conversation game, but coincides with the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs. Copyright 1990, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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|Note:||In : The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, 375-398, 1990|
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