Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case
One must allocate a finite set of indivisible goods among two agents without monetary compensation. We impose Pareto-efficiency, anonymity, a weak notion of no-envy, a welfare lower bound based on each agent’s ranking of the subsets of goods, and a monotonicity property w.r.t. changes in preferences. We prove that there is a rule satisfying these axioms. If there are three goods, it is the only rule, together with one of its subcorrespondences, satisfying each fairness axiom and not discriminating between goods. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013
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|Note:||In : Social Choice and Welfare, 41(2), 359-380, 2013|
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