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How lotteries outperform auctions

  • BOS, Olivier

In their recent paper Goeree et al. (2005) determine that all-pay auctions are better for fundraising activities than lotteries. We show that the introduction of asymmetry among participants with complete information could reverse this result. Complete information seems well suited to some charity environments.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.025
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number -2321.

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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:-2321
Note: In : Economics Letters, 110(3), 262-264, 2011
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  1. Arthur J.H.C. Schram & Sander Onderstal, 2009. "Bidding To Give: An Experimental Comparison Of Auctions For Charity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(2), pages 431-457, 05.
  2. Morgan, John, 2000. "Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 761-84, October.
  3. Olivier Bos, 2010. "Charity Auctions for the Happy Few," Working Paper Series in Economics 45, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
  4. Henrik Orzen, 2008. "Fundraising through Competition: Evidence from the Lab," Discussion Papers 2008-11, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  5. Frode Meland & Odd Rune Straume, 2006. "Outsourcing in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 1658, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Jacob K. Goeree & Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal & John L. Turner, 2005. "How (Not) to Raise Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 897-926, August.
  7. Maxim Engers & Brian McManus, 2007. "Charity Auctions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 953-994, 08.
  8. Fang, Hanming, 2002. " Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Models of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(3-4), pages 351-71, September.
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