International treaties on global pollution: a dynamic time-path analysis
In this paper we show that the formation of coalitions by subsets of countries might diminish the likelihood of a successful world-wide treaty on global pollution. Non-member countries may be less willing to sign a world-wide treaty than they would be in the absence of such coalitions. In fact, the coalition formation may raise the reservation utility of non-member countries above the world-wide treaty level and thus take away their incentives to sign it.
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|Note:||In : G. Ranis and L.K. Raut (eds.), Trade, Growth and Development. Essays in Honor of Professor T.N. Srinivasan. Amsterdam, Elsevier Science, 353-361, 1999|
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- Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
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