Delaying inter vivos transmissions under asymmetric information
This paper develops a model of bequeathing based on a moral hazard type of argument. This model explains why altruistic parents prefer late bequests to early inter-vivos gifts; it also analyzes whether or not they ought to leave rather equal bequests to their children even when the children end up with quite different incomes.
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|Note:||In : Southern Economic Journal, 65 (2), 322-330, 1998|
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