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Will international rules on subsidies disrupt the world trading system?

  • Kyle Bagwell

    ()

    (Columbia University - Department of Economics)

  • Robert W. Staiger

    ()

    (University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Economics)

We provide a first formal analysis of the international rules that govern the use of subsidies to domestic production. Our analysis highlights the impact of the new disciplines on subsidies that were added to GATT rules with the creation of the WTO. Our results suggest that, although GATT subsidy rules were typically viewed as weak and inadequate while the WTO subsidy rules are seen as representing a significant strengthening of multilateral disciplines on subsidies, the key changes introduced by the WTO subsidy rules may ultimately do more harm than good to the multilateral trading system, by undermining the ability of tariff negotiations to serve as the mechanism for expanding market access to more efficient levels.

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File URL: http://www.econ.columbia.edu/RePEc/pdf/DP0405-21.pdf
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Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0405-21.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:clu:wpaper:0405-21
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  1. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2001. "Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, And International Economic Institutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 519-562, May.
  2. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
  3. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2000. "Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and Agricultural Trade Disputes," NBER Working Papers 7822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "Subsidy Agreements," NBER Working Papers 10292, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
  6. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "The Economics of the World Trading System," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262524341, June.
  7. Kennan, John & Riezman, Raymond, 1988. "Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(1), pages 81-85, February.
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