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GATT-think

  • Kyle Bagwell

    ()

    (Columbia University - Department of Economics)

  • Robert W. Staiger

    ()

    (National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER))

In this paper, we present research that speaks to the purpose and design of GATT. The paper proceeds in three basic steps. We first discuss the major theoretical approaches to the study of trade agreements. Next, we develop the institutional context for our study with a description of the history and design of GATT and the WTO. Finally, we draw on the theoretical literature in order to interpret and evaluate the institutional design of GATT.

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File URL: http://www.econ.columbia.edu/RePEc/pdf/DP0102-39.pdf
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Paper provided by Columbia University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0102-39.

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Length: 99 pages
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:clu:wpaper:0102-39
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  1. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
  2. Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Scholarly Articles 3450062, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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  5. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1997. "Reciprocity, Non-discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System," NBER Working Papers 5932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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