Market Power and Cartel Formation: Theory and an Empirical Test
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- Filson, Darren, et al, 2001. "Market Power and Cartel Formation: Theory and an Empirical Test," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 465-480, October.
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- Swoboda, Sandra Maria, 2017. "Einfluss ausgewählter Determinanten auf die Kartellbildung und -stabilität: Eine Literaturstudie," Arbeitspapiere 176, University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives.
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"Do U.S. marketing orders have much market power? An examination of the Almond Board of California,"
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Keywordsmarketing order; cartel; collusion; empirical; agriculture;
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