Uniform Price Auctions and Fixed Price Offerings in IPOs: An Experimental Comparison
We compare uniform price auctions with fixed price offerings in Initial Public Offerings (IPO) using laboratory experiments. The experimental environment is based on the Biais and Faugeron-Grouzet (2002) model. Standard predictions based on tacit collusion equilibria (TCE) suggest lower revenues in uniform price auctions, although alternative equilibria allow for higher revenues. In our experiment, there is no evidence that TCE are played. The experiment suggests that the uniform price auctions are superior to fixed price offerings in terms of raising revenues.
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