Moral Hazard and Free Riding in Collective Action
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Other versions of this item:
- Vincent Anesi, 2009. "Moral hazard and free riding in collective action," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(2), pages 197-219, February.
- Vincent Anesi, 2007. "Moral Hazard and Free Riding in Collective Action," Discussion Papers 2007-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2012. "Lobbying as a Guard against Extremism," Working Papers 2072/184036, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- David Rietzke & Brian Roberson, 2013.
"The robustness of ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliances,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 937-956, April.
- David Rietzke & Brian Roberson, 2010. "The Robustness of ‘Enemy-of-My-Enemy-is-My-Friend’ Alliances," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1258, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Joan Esteban & Esther Hauk, 2008.
"Leadership in Collective Action,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
756.08, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Joan Esteban & Esther Hauk, 2009. "Leadership in Collective Action," Working Papers 362, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Zudenkova Galina, 2017. "Lobbying as a Guard against Extremism," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-17, February.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2010.
"Sincere Lobby Formation,"
MPRA Paper
28249, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "Sincere Lobby Formation," Working Papers 2072/151545, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
More about this item
Keywords
Collective action; Moral hazard in teams; Lobby formation; Free-rider problem;JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2007-09-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2007-09-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2007-09-16 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2007-09-16 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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