Design a Contract! A Simple Principal-Agent Problem as a Classroom Experiment
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Other versions of this item:
- Simon Gächter & Manfred Königstein, 2009. "Design a Contract: A Simple Principal-Agent Problem as a Classroom Experiment," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(2), pages 173-187, April.
- Simon Gaechter & Manfred Koenigstein, 2006. "Design a Contract! A Simple Principal-Agent Problem as a Classroom Experiment," Discussion Papers 2006-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Gächter, Simon & Königstein, Manfred, 2006. "Design a contract! : A simple principal-agent problem as a classroom experiment," Discussion Papers 2006,001E, University of Erfurt, Faculty of Economics, Law and Social Sciences.
References listed on IDEAS
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000.
"Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated". "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers 040, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series 336, CESifo Group Munich.
- Manfred K÷nigstein, 2001. "Optimal Contracting With Boundedly Rational Agents," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 18, pages 211-228.
- Vital Anderhub & Simon Gächter & Manfred Königstein, 2002.
"Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment,"
Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(1), pages 5-27, June.
- Vital Anderhub & Simon Gaechter & Manfred Koenigstein, "undated". "Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment," IEW - Working Papers 018, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Anderhub, Vital & Gächter, Simon & Königstein, Manfred, 1999. "Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,82, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Colin F. Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, 1995. "Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-219, Spring.
More about this item
KeywordsClassroom experiments; post-contractual opportunism; incentive contracts; efficiency; reciprocity; Coase theorem;
- A22 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Undergraduate
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-07-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2006-07-21 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2006-07-21 (Experimental Economics)
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