Staff Rotation: A Powerful Weapon Against Corruption?
The German federal government intends to introduce regular staff rotation as a precautionary measure against corruption in public administrations. To test the effectiveness of this instrument, we conduct an experiment using the bribery game by Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (1999), in which pairs of potential bribers and public officials are randomly re-matched in every round. The data are compared to the analogous treatment with fixed pairs. The results provide strong evidence for the effectiveness of staff rotation in the experimental environment. The level of bribes as well as the frequency of inefficient decisions caused by bribery are reduced significantly.
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|Date of creation:||Oct 1999|
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