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Simultaneous Evolution of Learning Rules and Strategies

  • Kirchkamp, Oliver

We study a model of local evolution. Players are located on a network and play games agains their neighbors. Players are characterized by three properties: (1) The stage game strategies they use agains their neighbors. (2) The repeated game strategy that determines the former. (3) A learning rule that selects the repeated game strategy, on the basis of the player's own and the neighbors' payoff and repeated game strategy. The dynamics that specifies learning rules is given exogenously. Players sample their neighbors' learning rules and their respective payoff. Then they construct a model that related parameters of the learning rules to payoffs. Given this model they choose an optimal learning rule. We find that under this dynamics learning rules emerge in the long run which behave deterministically but which are asymmetric in the sense that while learning they put more weight on the learning players experience then on the observed players one. Nevertheless stage game behavior under these learning rules is similar to behavior using symmetric learning rules.

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Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 379.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: May 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:379
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

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  1. Binmore, Ken & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Discussion Paper Serie B 275, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996.
  3. Oliver Kirchkamp, 1994. "Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Game Theory and Information 9403003, EconWPA, revised 18 May 1994.
  4. Schlag,Karl, . "Dynamic stability in the repeated prisoners dilemma," Discussion Paper Serie B 243, University of Bonn, Germany.
  5. repec:att:wimass:9612 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Eshel, Ilan & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 1998. "Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 157-79, March.
  7. Eshel, I. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A., 1996. "Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," Working papers 9612r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  8. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
  9. Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany.
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