Asynchronous Evolution of Pairs How spatial evolution leads to enequality
We present a simple model of spatial evolution that avoids several problems that arise with more complex networks of players. We consider a world where pairs of players are permanently matched. These players learn from the whole population but they are more likely to learn to strategies used by their partners. Thus, several features of spatial evolution are captured while nonlinearities that would arise with more complex networks are avoided. We can identify characteristics of evolution in networks such as stable cooperation in prisoners' dilemma games and long run exploitation among different strategies. We furthermore discuss evolution of repeated game strategies in this framework comparing synchonous models with asynchronous ones.
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|Date of creation:||Oct 1995|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany|
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- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 2000.
"Spatial evolution of automata in the prisoners' dilemma,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 239-262, October.
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- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1995. "Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Discussion Paper Serie B 330, University of Bonn, Germany.
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"Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model,"
9612r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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- Bryan Routledge, "undated". "Co-Evolution and Spatial Interactoin," GSIA Working Papers 1997-46, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Schelling, Thomas C, 1969. "Models of Segregation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 488-493, May.
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